The Three Circles of Consciousness
January 19, 2023 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198805397.003.0008 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Citations | 7 |
| Key points | Argues that not all phenomenal properties vary with representational content: some vary with attitude, and one substantive phenomenal commonality—the for-me-ness component of experience—is invariant across all conscious states. Proposes that phenomenality comprises three concentric layers: content-based, attitude-based, and for-me-ness. |
Abstract
Abstract A widespread assumption in current philosophy of mind is that a conscious state’s phenomenal properties vary with its representational contents. In this chapter, I present an alternative picture that admits two kinds of phenomenal properties that do not vary with content. First, there are phenomenal properties that vary rather with attitude. Secondly, there is a kind of phenomenal property that varies neither with content nor with attitude but is altogether invariant across all conscious states: a substantive phenomenal commonality among all experiences. This substantive commonality, I suggest, is the for-me-ness component of what it is like for me to have any experience. The chapter closes with a discussion of the interrelations among these three concentric layers of phenomenality: content-based, attitude-based, and for-me-ness.