A new obstacle for phenomenal contrast
Matthew Fulkerson, Jonathan Cohen
The Philosophical Quarterly February 3, 2025 DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqaf009 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Phenomenal Contrast Arguments face a general and underexplored obstacle: proponents often assume a phenomenal difference without adequately ruling out cognitive or other non-phenomenal explanations for the contrast. The authors do not preclude successful PCAs but contend that many existing instances fail to meet this burden. |
Abstract
Abstract Phenomenal Contrast Arguments (PCAs) are a prominent method in philosophy of mind for, among other uses, investigating how specific mental features shape the phenomenal character of experience. This paper identifies a general and underexplored obstacle to the success of PCAs: The necessity of demonstrating that the contrasts employed in these arguments are genuinely phenomenal, rather than merely cognitive or otherwise non-phenomenal. We contend that proponents of PCAs often assume a phenomenal difference without adequately ruling out these alternative explanations for the available contrast. While we do not preclude the possibility of successful PCAs, our arguments suggest that many existing instances fail to meet this burden.