Skip to content

The Stream of Consciousness: IX. James's Ejective Consciousness (Second Part)

Thomas Natsoulas

Imagination, Cognition and Personality October 1, 1995 DOI: 10.2190/8dgd-lubk-mrrq-95uv (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that William James countenanced a second stream of consciousness in altered states, distinct from nonconscious mental occurrences, with each stream possessing inner awareness of its own components.

Abstract

As in the preceding article of the present series, I continue to examine William James's thought in The Principles of Psychology regarding what he there called “ejective consciousness.” James held that, in certain altered states, and perhaps at other times as well, mental occurrences may take place that are not components of the individual's original stream of consciousness. Usually if not always, such “split-off” occurrences comprise a second stream, which, according to James, is no less conscious and personal than the original stream is. However, the components of the second stream must be distinguished from nonconscious mental occurrences. Whereas James argues at some length against the existence of the nonconscious mental, of which there cannot be any inner awareness by definition, James does countenance the unusual presence of a second stream of consciousness, of which the first stream can have knowledge only inferentially, and vice versa. Both streams include inner awareness of their own basic durational components.