Bain’s Philosophy of Mind
Alexander Bain May 26, 2026 DOI: 10.1093/9780192595362.003.0002 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Historical analysis Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that Bain's denial of the mind's spatial extension created an inconsistent metaphysics, but his methodological views on studying the mind have lasting value despite his ontological confusions. |
Abstract
Abstract Bain was a materialist in some sense, rejecting substance dualism and providing neurological explanations for many psychological phenomena. But he denied the mind location or extension in space. This chapter critically explores Bain’s metaphysics and epistemology of mind and the arguments that kept him from identifying each mind with the brain or nervous system of an animal. Bain’s neurological accounts of consciousness and memory are described in detail and the intuitions that drove him to deny the mind extension are subjected to critical analysis. Bain’s methodological views on how to best study the mind, and how we can know when we have arrived at a fully satisfying explanation of mental phenomena, were crafted to make sense of an inconsistent metaphysics, but they have a value that has outlasted Bain’s ontological confusions.