Against Emergent Dualism
May 16, 2018 DOI: 10.1002/9781119468004.ch5 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that emergent dualism faces several new problems that non-emergent versions of substance dualism avoid, and is therefore not more attractive than those alternatives. |
Abstract
Introduction Materialism permeates philosophy of mind. Yet, increasing difficulties are triggering dissent. William Hasker’s insightful yet underappreciated work in the philosophy of mind is representative. Hasker does not favor the recent turn toward non-reductive physicalism either. Rather, his argument from the unity of consciousness entails SUBSTANCE DUALISM. Additionally, Hasker maintains that the soul is an emergent substance, a view he calls EMERGENT DUALISM. 2 Hasker’s criticisms of materialism are formidable, and his unity of consciousness argument deserves considerable attention. Still, EMERGENT DUALISM faces difficulties. I argue that EMERGENT DUALISM is not more attractive than non-emergent versions of SUBSTANCE DUALISM as Hasker suggests. I raise several new problems for EMERGENT DUALISM that non-emergent versions of SUBSTANCE DUALISM evade.