Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Authoritative Self-Knowledge
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) October 1, 2008 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2008.00248.x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that a third kind of view, distinct from same-order and higher-order accounts, is needed to make intelligible certain cases of authoritative self-knowledge, and defends this view against the claim that a same-order view suffices. |
Abstract
Many recent discussions of self-consciousness and self-knowledge assume that there are only two kinds of accounts available to be taken on the relation between the so-called first-order (conscious) states and subjects' awareness or knowledge of them: a same-order, or reflexive view, on the one hand, or a higher-order one, on the other. I maintain that there is a third kind of view that is distinctively different from these two options. The view is important because it can accommodate and make intelligible certain cases of authoritative self-knowledge that cannot easily be made intelligible, if at all, by these other two types of accounts. My aim in this paper is to defend this view against those who maintain that a same-order view is sufficient to account for authoritative self-knowledge.