A Constructivist Picture of Self-Knowledge
Philosophy July 1, 1996 DOI: 10.1017/s0031819100041668 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 24 |
| Key points | Argues that the authority and apparent immediacy of first-person reports of mental states, which a Cartesian view would explain by direct, undistorted inner presentation, survive rejection of that view only if an alternative account is found. Notes that Wittgenstein offered potent considerations against the traditional view and that contemporary philosophy of mind largely rejects some of its metaphysical aspects. |
Abstract
How are we to account for the authority granted to first-person reports of mental states? What accounts for the immediacy of these self-ascriptions; the fact that they can be ascribed without appeal to evidence and without the need for justification? A traditional, Cartesian conception of the mind, which says that our thoughts are presented to us directly, completely, and without distortion upon mere internal inspection, would account for these facts, but there is good reason to doubt the cogency of the Cartesian view. Wittgenstein, in his later writings, offered some of the most potent considerations against the traditional view, and contemporary philosophy of mind is practically unanimous in rejecting some of the metaphysical aspects of Cartesianism. But anyone who repudiates Cartesianism shoulders the burden of finding another way to accommodate its apparent epistemological strengths.