Subject, Self-Consciousness, and Self-Knowledge in Kant’s Transcendental Philosophy
Studies in Transcendental Philosophy 2022 DOI: 10.18254/s271326680023706-6 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Kant's doctrine of transcendental apperception is not an introspective psychological account but a formal model of thinking activity that explains central concepts of subjecthood, distinct from the sensory self-awareness of inner sense or empirical apperception. |
Abstract
Kant points to two forms of self-consciousness: the inner sense, or empirical apperception, based on a sensory form of self-awareness, and transcendental apperception. Through the notion of inner sense, Kant also allows for an introspective account of self-awareness; nonetheless, Kant holds an utterly sophisticated notion of basic self-consciousness provided for by the notion of transcendental apperception. As we will see, the doctrine of apperception is not to be confused with an introspective psychological approach: in reality, it is a formal model for the thinking activity itself which explains the most central concepts regarding subjecthood.