The Conventional Status of Reflexive Awareness: What's at Stake in a Tibetan Debate?
Philosophy East and West April 1, 2006 DOI: 10.1353/pew.2006.0020 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 30 |
| Key points | Argues that Tsong khapa's position—consciousness is not intrinsically reflexive even conventionally—is philosophically defensible and that his reading of Candrakīrti and Śāntideva is sound, countering Mipham's critique. |
Abstract
rJe Tsong khapa argues that consciousness is not intrinsically reflexive even conventionally, and reads Candrakīrti and Śāntideva as endorsing this view. 'Ju Mipham Rinpoche (1846-1912) criticizes Tsong khapa's argument and his reading of Candrakīrti, arguing that while ultimately consciousness is not intrinsically reflexive, conventionally it is. This article defends Tsong khapa's philosophy of mind and his hermeneutical strategy and shows that this debate is important both philosophically and doxographically.