Reflexivism
Oxford University Press eBooks April 26, 2012 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652365.003.0011 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Dignāga's sixth-century defense of reflexivism (svasaṃvedana) rests on a "two aspects" theory of representation and on the claim that higher-order theories of consciousness are regressive. The author contends that Dignāga's representational self-model theory, in which a first-person perspective turns the subject-aspect of thought into an object-aspect, shows that first-person access to one's own mental past requires a reflexively self-aware first-person stance. |
Abstract
This chapter discusses a development that took place in Buddhism in the sixth century, and subsequently had wide repercussions in the Indian discussion of self. Reflexivism (svasaṃvedana) is the thesis that self‐consciousness consists in conscious mental occurrences being reflexively conscious of themselves. Dignāga's defence of reflexivism consists in part in a new “two aspects” theory of representation, and in part in an argument that higher‐order theories of consciousness are regressive. He presents an argument based on what is involved in the idea that one can have first‐person access to the subjectivity of one's past mental life. With his theory that intentional content is comprised of both an object‐aspect and a subject‐aspect, Dignāga replaces the phenomenal mineness account of subjective immersion with a representational self‐model theory, in which a first‐person perspective consists in turning the subject‐aspect of one's thought into an object‐aspect. The brilliance of Dignāga's argument consists in its demonstration that the possibility of having a first‐person perspective on the one's own mental past requires that a first‐person stance consists in being reflexively self‐aware.