Meta-Cognition and the Reflexivity Thesis
Buddhist Physicalism? August 5, 2025 DOI: 10.1093/9780197799697.003.0005 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's reflexivity thesis—that consciousness is self-illuminating—has difficulty avoiding solipsism, and proposes an abductive-inferential account of meta-cognition as an alternative explanation of how we report our own cognitions. |
Abstract
Abstract This chapter examines the attempt by the New Yogācāra philosophers Dignāga and Dharmakīrti to show that occurrences of consciousness are the only ultimately real entities. It critically examines their arguments for the claim that a given occurrence of consciousness cognizes not only its intentional object but also itself—that consciousness is reflexively self-illuminating. It argues that their approach has difficulty avoiding solipsism. It critically examines the claim that a cognition’s noetic and noematic poles are non-distinct. And it introduces an abductive-inferential account of meta-cognition that serves as an alternative to the reflexivity thesis as a way of explaining our ability to report our own cognitions.