Thinking and Phenomenal Consciousness
Balkan Journal of Philosophy 2011 DOI: 10.5840/bjp20113121 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that the debate over the phenomenality of thinking, particularly the reductionist/antireductionist dialectic, warrants skepticism, implying the framing may obscure rather than clarify the relation between thinking and phenomenal consciousness. |
Abstract
The topic of this paper concerns the relation between thinking and phenomenality as it is discussed in the Philosophy of Mind. Thus, I am addressing the following questions: does the domain of phenomenal consciousness include thinking? And if so, is the phenomenality of thinking (PT) proprietary or not? I will firstly present the debate and the main notions involved in it, by contrasting a certain mainstream picture of the mind with the one offered by Phenomenology. Second, I will consider the particular question of a proprietary phenomenology of conscious thought through the examination of the reductionist and antireductionist positions, concluding with a sceptical remark towards this dialectics.