Whitehead's process philosophy offers a promising basis for solving the hard problem of consciousness by showing how the concept of consciousness is anchored in his metaphysical theory. Comparing Whitehead's speculative account with Piaget's empirical research results reveals that their positions on consciousness overlap widely, providing indirect empirical support for Whitehead's philosophy. At the two points where they deviate, Whitehead holds the more plausible position. This investigation confirms William Seager's suggestion that more attention should be drawn to Whitehead's process philosophy when addressing both the hard and weak problems of consciousness. Two topics discussed from Whitehead's perspective are learning and consciousness, and artificial consciousness.
This paper examines Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, which holds that a conscious state arises when a non-conscious mental state is accompanied by an appropriate higher-order mental representation. The author explains key elements of the theory and identifies several problems, including the role of qualia in explaining the phenomenal character of sensory experience versus the content of the HOT, and a tension between Rosenthal's claim that all mental states are intentional and the view that sensory states are non-intentional and qualitative. A dilemma is raised about transitive consciousness attributed to HOTs: if transitive consciousness is factive but thoughts are not, it is unclear how all HOTs can constitute transitive awareness.
Fyodor Dostoevsky, the renowned Russian novelist, suffered from epilepsy, and his novels contain detailed descriptions of seizures likely drawn from personal experience. The type of epilepsy he had is often called "Dostoevsky's epilepsy with ecstatic aura," characterized by a blissful, ecstatic sensation before a seizure. This article reviews the literature on Dostoevsky's epilepsy and compares the ecstatic aura with mystical experience, concluding that the two states are identical: mystical experience can occur during an ecstatic aura. A neuroscientific explanation of this experience is provided, followed by a philosophical analysis.