On the supposed limits of physicalist theories of mind
Philosophical Studies May 22, 2010 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-010-9558-4 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 18 |
| Key points | Argues that minimal physicalism is compatible with panpsychism and fundamental mentality, and that the “No Fundamental Mentality” constraint should be jettisoned. |
Abstract
Is physicalism compatible with either panpsychism or so-called “fundamental mentality”? Minimal physicalism, I contend, is compatible with both. We should therefore jettison the “No Fundamental Mentality” constraint, a proposed constraint on the definition of “the physical”, not to mention the false limits it places on physicalist theories of mind.