Definition and the Mind–Body Problem
Alan J. McComas
Sherrington's Loom October 11, 2019 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190936549.003.0002 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that consciousness can be defined as "an organism's awareness of itself" and defends epiphenomenalism, the position that the mind is a product of the brain's workings and that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of brain activity. |
Abstract
Abstract: This chapter is concerned with definition and the monism–dualism debate. It first deals with two major issues—a definition of consciousness and the mind–brain problem. The former is simply stated as “consciousness is an organism’s awareness of itself.” After arriving at a clear working definition, the chapter turns to the mind–brain problem. It pays particular attention to the monism–dualism debate, the former of which argues that there is only one unifying reality. From here, the chapter jump-starts a discussion on consciousness as an epiphenomenon of brain activity, ultimately with a conclusion in favor of epiphenomenalism, in the sense that the mind is a product of the working of the brain.