Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self
Trends in Cognitive Sciences October 12, 2013 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.007 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Interoception Embodied cognition Neurocognitive Predictive coding Inference Cognitive psychology Perception Feeling Perspective graphical Cognitive science Context archaeology Enactivism Categorization Coding social sciences Epistemology Artificial intelligence |
| Citations | 1,812 |
| Key points | Proposes that subjective feeling states (emotions) arise from actively-inferred generative models of the causes of interoceptive afferents, generalizing appraisal theories and shedding light on body ownership and conscious selfhood. |
Abstract
The concept of the brain as a prediction machine has enjoyed a resurgence in the context of the Bayesian brain and predictive coding approaches within cognitive science. To date, this perspective has been applied primarily to exteroceptive perception (e.g., vision, audition), and action. Here, I describe a predictive, inferential perspective on interoception: 'interoceptive inference' conceives of subjective feeling states (emotions) as arising from actively-inferred generative (predictive) models of the causes of interoceptive afferents. The model generalizes 'appraisal' theories that view emotions as emerging from cognitive evaluations of physiological changes, and it sheds new light on the neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie the experience of body ownership and conscious selfhood in health and in neuropsychiatric illness.