Bertrand Russell’s Philosophy of Mind
Oxford University Press eBooks May 21, 2026 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190845667.013.12 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThis chapter traces the development of Bertrand Russell's philosophy of mind from panpsychism and idealism through dualism to neutral monism. It contends that Russell's positions were consistently shaped by engagement with empirical psychology and natural science. His changing accounts of mentality were tied to evolving views about experience, the subject of experience, and introspection. The trajectory is argued to be more complex and less linear than often acknowledged, involving both continuities and substantive revisions.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Subject documents Idealism Scope computer science Natural archaeology |
| Key finding | Argues that Russell's philosophy of mind was consistently shaped by empirical psychology and natural science, and that his trajectory is more complex and less linear than often acknowledged. |
Abstract
Abstract This chapter traces the development of Bertrand Russell’s philosophy of mind from his early engagements with panpsychism and idealism through his dualist period and finally to his mature neutral monism. It advances three central claims. First, Russell’s positions on the mind are consistently shaped by his sustained engagement with empirical psychology and the natural sciences. Second, his shifting accounts of mentality are closely tied to evolving views about experience, the subject of experience, and the scope and limits of introspection. Third, the trajectory of Russell’s philosophy of mind is more complex and less linear than is often acknowledged, involving significant continuities as well as substantive revisions.