Bertrand Russell’s Philosophy of Mind
Oxford University Press eBooks May 21, 2026 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190845667.013.12 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Subject documents Idealism Scope computer science Natural archaeology Experimental philosophy Epistemology Empirical evidence |
| Key points | Argues that Russell's philosophy of mind was consistently shaped by empirical psychology and natural science, and that his trajectory is more complex and less linear than often acknowledged. |
Abstract
Abstract This chapter traces the development of Bertrand Russell’s philosophy of mind from his early engagements with panpsychism and idealism through his dualist period and finally to his mature neutral monism. It advances three central claims. First, Russell’s positions on the mind are consistently shaped by his sustained engagement with empirical psychology and the natural sciences. Second, his shifting accounts of mentality are closely tied to evolving views about experience, the subject of experience, and the scope and limits of introspection. Third, the trajectory of Russell’s philosophy of mind is more complex and less linear than is often acknowledged, involving significant continuities as well as substantive revisions.