Explaining the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness: Prescission Instead of Reification
Marc Champagne
Dialogue March 1, 2009 DOI: 10.1017/s0012217309090088 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 5 |
| Key points | Argues that the explanatory gap in consciousness studies is fostered by a want of notional distinctions and can be addressed by recuperating Block's intuitions without reifying phenomenal consciousness, using Peirce's type/token/tone trichotomy to show distinctness stems from prescinding qualities from occurrences. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT: This paper suggests that it is largely a want of notional distinctions which fosters the “explanatory gap” that has beset the study of consciousness since T. Nagel’s revival of the topic. Modifying Ned Block’s controversial claim that we should countenance a “phenomenal-consciousness” which exists in its own right, we argue that there is a way to recuperate the intuitions he appeals to without engaging in an onerous reification of the facet in question. By renewing with the full type/token/tone trichotomy developed by C. S. Peirce, we think the distinctness Block (rightly) calls attention to can be seen as stemming not from any separate module lurking within the mind, but rather from our ability toprescindqualities from occurrences.
Citations in the library
Cites 5
- Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 2007
- The Function of Consciousness Noûs September 1, 1996
- On Consciousness and Semiosis Cognitive Semiotics September 1, 2007
- The Case for Qualia May 2, 2008
- P-Consciousness presentation/A-Consciousness representation Behavioral and Brain Sciences March 1, 1997