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Artificial intelligences and the problem of consciousness

Alexandre Quaresma

PAAKAT: Revista de Tecnología y Sociedad February 28, 2019 DOI: 10.32870/pk.a9n16.349 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that consciousness presupposes life and is a state that can only be attributed to living systems, not to artificial intelligences.

Abstract

A major difficulty for the engineers and designers of artificial intelligence (AI) systems has been to replicate consciousness. After all, it has always been assumed that only living beings may be conscious or not. The paper examines the nature of consciousness in the biological world and the conditions that must be fulfilled before consciousness can be attributed to some organism. States of consciousness in organic systems are compared to states of artificial cybernetic information processing systems, such as computers, androids and robots, to which consciousness might be or has been attributed. The claims of orthodox cognitive scientists and the advocates of a “strong AI” with respect to consciousness are examined in detail. The paper gives continuity to the author’s previous studies on the limits of computation, in particular, on intentionality in the context of artificial intelligences. Its main argument is that consciousness presupposes life. It is a state that can only attributed to living systems.