Can artificial systems become conscious?—Recursive embodied closure as an integrative framework
Achim Schilling, Patrick Krauss
Frontiers in Psychology September 30, 2026 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1950309 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that consciousness is best understood as an emergent property of recursively embodied, environmentally embedded cognitive systems rather than of biological matter itself, and that artificial systems including simulations could in principle be conscious because the relevant mechanisms appear largely substrate-independent and no biological process has been shown to be uniquely necessary for consciousness. |
Abstract
Recent advances in artificial intelligence, connectomics, and computational neuroscience increasingly raise the question of whether artificial systems—or even pure computer simulations—could become conscious. Contemporary theories emphasize embodiment, predictive processing, homeostatic regulation, and continuous interaction between cognition, body, and environment rather than isolated computation. We propose recursive embodied closure as an integrative framework linking embodied, predictive, functionalist, and dynamical approaches to consciousness. Rather than replacing existing theories, the framework identifies a shared organizational principle: the continuous recursive coupling of cognition, bodily regulation, action, and environmental feedback. We argue that consciousness may, in principle, emerge in artificial systems, including computational simulations, for three reasons. First, consciousness may depend on recursively closed loops linking cognition, body, and environment, and such loops could also be realized in robotic, neuromorphic, or virtual embodiments. Second, evidence from comparative neuroscience, convergent evolution, neurotechnology, and philosophy of mind suggests that the mechanisms relevant for consciousness are largely substrate-independent and may therefore be implemented in both biological and artificial systems. Third, although unknown physical mechanisms cannot be excluded, there is currently no empirical evidence for biological processes that are uniquely necessary for consciousness. Taken together, these considerations support the view that consciousness is best understood as an emergent property of recursively embodied, environmentally embedded cognitive systems rather than of biological matter itself. If so, biological brains, artificial neural networks, neuromorphic hardware, and even virtual agents may constitute plausible candidates for future artificial consciousness.
Citations in the library
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and 11 more in the library