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Insect Consciousness.

Morten Overgaard

Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience May 21, 2021 DOI: 10.3389/fnbeh.2021.653041 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Insects Methodology Subjective experience Theories of consciousness Measures of consciousness
Key points Argues that the question of consciousness in species such as insects is highly challenging because no available empirical method can answer it and because current theories of consciousness disagree about whether consciousness requires specific structures, such as neural ones, or can be realized in different ways. The author sets out to analyze whether empirical or theoretical approaches to the topic are possible on the basis of current human consciousness research.

Abstract

The question of consciousness in other species, not least species very physically different from humans such as insects, is highly challenging for a number of reasons. One reason is that we do not have any available empirical method to answer the question. Another reason is that current theories of consciousness disagree about the relation between physical structure and consciousness, i.e., whether consciousness requires specific, say, neural structures or whether consciousness can be realized in different ways. This article sets out to analyze if and how there could be an empirical and/or a theoretical approach to the topic on the basis of current consciousness research in humans.

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