Can physical fields bind consciousness? Limits to classical electromagnetism and quantum routes to phenomenal unity

Abstract

Physics-based theories of consciousness must explain how distributed neural activity can constitute a single complex experience. Multiple electromagnetic field theories claim that fields solve this phenomenal binding problem because they are (i) physically unified as spatially extended objects, (ii) continuous, and/or (iii) information-distributing, and thereby address critiques levied against purely synaptic connectionist mechanisms. We review these three claims and argue that they are not supported by classical electromagnetism. Maxwellian field dynamics are local: field evolution at a point depends on quantities in its local neighbourhood, continuity does not automatically generate irreducible physical unity, and local field values do not grant access to globally distributed information. Classical electromagnetic fields influence neural dynamics, but they do not provide the kind of unity required for phenomenal binding in the terms specified by the target theories. We then conduct a structured search to identify areas of nonclassical physics that may better realize the theorists’ ambitions, including contemporary models featuring state nonseparability or dynamic nonlocality. We outline major theoretical and empirical challenges facing these nonclassical approaches to explaining consciousness with a physical basis for experiential unity.