The affectively embodied perspective of the subject
S. Smith
Philosophical Psychology May 27, 2022 DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2081143 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Proposes that the subjective character of phenomenal consciousness is at least partially constituted by embodied affect, the ability to feel with one's body. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT This paper treats of phenomenal consciousness and its relation to an organism’s capacity to be hedonically perturbed by its environment. This paper offers an empirically informed, phenomenologically descriptive conceptual analysis of subjective character in terms of an organism’s ability to feel with its body. The subjective character of phenomenal consciousness is at least partially constituted by embodied affect, that is, by our ability to feel what is happening on and inside our living bodies. It is in virtue of our being able to feel with our bodies that our experiences disclose the world as seeming a certain way for us. I call this the “affectively embodied perspectival view” of subjective character (AEP).
Citations in the library
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