An Existential Attention Norm for Affectively Biased Sentient Beings: A Buddhist Intervention from Buddhaghosa
Journal of the American Philosophical Association January 9, 2025 DOI: 10.1017/apa.2024.16 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Buddhism |
| Keywords | Existentialism Norm philosophy Epistemology Theology |
| Key points | Argues that Buddhist philosophy, especially Buddhaghosa's work, provides an existential norm of attention that commands proper attention to oneself and the world to transform one's cognitive-emotional constitution and achieve liberation from suffering. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT This article argues that our attention is pervasively biased by embodied affects and that we are normatively assessable in light of this. From a contemporary perspective, normative theorizing about attention is a relatively new trend (Siegel 2017: Ch. 9, Irving 2019, Bommarito 2018: Ch. 5). However, Buddhist philosophy has provided us with a well-spring of normatively rich theorizing about attention from its inception. This article will address how norms of attention are dealt with in Buddhaghosa’s (5 th -6 th CE) claims about how wholesome forms of empathy can go wrong. Through this analysis, I will show that Buddhist philosophers like Buddhaghosa think there is an existential norm of attention, one that commands us not just to pay attention to ourselves and the world properly, but one whereby we are exhorted to attend to ourselves in a way that gradually transforms our cognitive-emotional constitution so that we become liberated from suffering.