Paradox and cross purposes in recent work on consciousness.
Cognition April 1, 2001 DOI: 10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00129-3 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that global workspace theory fits the functionalist perspective, whereas physicalism treats consciousness as a biological phenomenon that implements global accessibility. |
Abstract
Functionalists about consciousness identify consciousness with a role; physicalists identify consciousness with an implementer of that role. The global workspace theory of consciousness fits the functionalist perspective, but the physicalist sees consciousness as a biological phenomenon that implements global accessibility.
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- The relationship between awareness and attention: evidence from ERP responses. Neuropsychologia November 1, 2009
- Consciousness and Cognitive Access Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society October 1, 2008
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