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Paradox and cross purposes in recent work on consciousness.

N Block

Cognition April 1, 2001 DOI: 10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00129-3 (opens in new tab) via PubMed

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Functionalists define consciousness by its role, while physicalists define it as the biological mechanism that performs that role. Global workspace theory aligns with functionalism, treating consciousness as a functional process. Physicalists, however, view consciousness as a biological phenomenon that implements global accessibility, meaning it is the physical brain's activity that realizes the functional role.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key finding Argues that global workspace theory fits the functionalist perspective, whereas physicalism treats consciousness as a biological phenomenon that implements global accessibility.

Abstract

Functionalists about consciousness identify consciousness with a role; physicalists identify consciousness with an implementer of that role. The global workspace theory of consciousness fits the functionalist perspective, but the physicalist sees consciousness as a biological phenomenon that implements global accessibility.

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