Paradox and cross purposes in recent work on consciousness.
Cognition April 1, 2001 DOI: 10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00129-3 (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractFunctionalists define consciousness by its role, while physicalists define it as the biological mechanism that performs that role. Global workspace theory aligns with functionalism, treating consciousness as a functional process. Physicalists, however, view consciousness as a biological phenomenon that implements global accessibility, meaning it is the physical brain's activity that realizes the functional role.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that global workspace theory fits the functionalist perspective, whereas physicalism treats consciousness as a biological phenomenon that implements global accessibility. |
Abstract
Functionalists about consciousness identify consciousness with a role; physicalists identify consciousness with an implementer of that role. The global workspace theory of consciousness fits the functionalist perspective, but the physicalist sees consciousness as a biological phenomenon that implements global accessibility.