A neurofunctional theory of visual consciousness.
Consciousness and Cognition June 1, 2000 DOI: 10.1006/ccog.2000.0442 (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractVisual consciousness depends on mental representations at an intermediate level of processing, a hypothesis supported by neuropsychological evidence. Attention, which can be guided by high-level representations, is also necessary for consciousness. This theory challenges higher-order thought accounts, the multiple drafts account, and the belief that sensation precedes perception. It also illustrates a methodology that bridges functionalist approaches that ignore the brain and neural reductionists who reject functionalism.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that visual consciousness requires both intermediate-level mental representations and attention, and that this theory has consequences for competing accounts of consciousness. |
Abstract
This paper develops an empirically motivated theory of visual consciousness. It begins by outlining neuropsychological support for Jackendoff's (1987) hypothesis that visual consciousness involves mental representations at an intermediate level of processing. It then supplements that hypothesis with the further requirement that attention, which can come under the direction of high level representations, is also necessary for consciousness. The resulting theory is shown to have a number of philosophical consequences. If correct, higher-order thought accounts, the multiple drafts account, and the widely held belief that sensation precedes perception will all be found wanting. The theory will also be used to illustrate and defend a methodology that fills the gulf between functionalists who ignore the brain and neural reductionists who repudiate functionalism.