Dualisms, Functionalisms, Consciousness-Criteria

The authors argue that two dominant theories of consciousness—dualism and functionalism—are both flawed, though for different reasons than usually recognized. Dualism wrongly assumes consciousness is non-physical without a clear understanding of physicality. Functionalism, the prevailing scientific view, holds that being conscious is unphysical, a consequence of propositions such as the multiple realizability of consciousness. This makes abstract functionalism as vulnerable to objections as dualism. The authors question whether most science actually adopts "physical functionalism," which they contend is self-contradictory when understood naturally.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Abstract There are reasons to look at two existing kinds of theories of consciousness, including the need to elicit criteria by which to judge any theory of consciousness. One kind is dualism, still persisting, and the other is functionalism, dominant in the sciences of mind and consciousness. They are treated differently, wrongly. Dualisms are taken to be to the effect that consciousness is non-physical, taken so persuasively if without the benefit of an understanding of physicality. Abstract functionalism is to the effect, unnoticed, that being conscious, whatever its relation to brains or computers, is unphysical. This is the upshot of several prized propositions, one about multiple realizability of consciousness in physical bases. Abstract functionalism is therefore as vulnerable to certain objections as the dualisms. Does much of science in fact tacitly contemplate physical functionalism, which is true to its name? A pity if so, since physical functionalism as naturally understood is self-contradictory.