Searle on the biology of seeing.
Pierre Le Morvan
Studies in history and philosophy of biological and biomedical sciences October 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2018.10.004 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Biologism Consciousness Mental states Perception Seeing |
| Key points | Argues that Searle's biological considerations fail to establish that seeing is a conscious state not constituted by the objects seen and fail to defeat a rival object-inclusive view. Contends that taking seeing to be a biological state is compatible with its being partially constituted by the objects seen. |
Abstract
Searle offers an account of seeing as a conscious state not constituted by the object(s) seen. I focus in this article on his biological case for this thesis, and argue that the biological considerations he adduces neither establish his own position nor defeat a rival object-inclusive view. I show (among other things) that taking seeing to be a biological state is compatible with its being (partially) constituted by the object(s) seen.