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Process Metaphysics of Consciousness

Prentner Robert

Open Philosophy March 3, 2019 DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2018-0002 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Process thought Consciousness Mereology Mereological structure Embodiment Constitution Causation Cognition Systems theory
Key points Argues that adopting process metaphysics and mereological language dissolves the hard problem of consciousness, making it tractable for scientific inquiry.

Abstract

In this article, we look at the hard problem of consciousness from the perspective of process metaphysics. We thereby identify three problematic premises of the problem that pertain to the constitution of consciousness and its causal relation to the world. We argue for the necessity of re-thinking the corresponding phenomena in terms of internally-structured processes. The hard problem would then cease to be an insurmountable obstacle to a science of consciousness. Furthermore, this line of reasoning is shown to be continuous with philosophical projects from the early 20th century that preceded the contemporary philosophy of mind. Specifically, we investigate the relationship of parts and wholes, and translate metaphysical problems of consciousness into mereological language. Despite this being a philosophical project, we frequently note and discuss links to the empirical sciences, in particular those of quantum mechanics, systems theory and the embodied cognition framework.

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