Skip to content

THE HARD PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Bozarkul Xuddayberdiyevich Karimov

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) October 22, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23567350 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that consciousness is a central problem in contemporary philosophy of mind and that its study requires an interdisciplinary approach combining philosophical analysis with neuroscience and cognitive science. The article reviews the evolution of mind–body debates and the "hard problem of consciousness" as formulated by Nagel, Jackson, and Chalmers, alongside alternative positions from Dennett and Searle and scientific theories such as global workspace theory and integrated information theory.

Abstract

The article examines the problem of consciousness as one of the central issues of contemporary philosophy of mind. The evolution of approaches to the mind–body problem is traced from Cartesian dualism through logical behaviourism, the identity theory and functionalism to modern debates on the subjective character of experience. Particular attention is paid to the arguments of T. Nagel, F. Jackson and D. Chalmers, who formulated the "hard problem of consciousness", as well as to the alternative positions of D. Dennett and J. Searle. Scientific theories of consciousness – the global workspace theory and integrated information theory – are analyzed, and the philosophical significance of the problem for the development of artificial intelligence is discussed. The author argues that the study of consciousness requires an interdisciplinary approach that combines philosophical analysis with the achievements of neuroscience and cognitive science.

Comparable studies

Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.

Explore topics