Modeling Working Memory to Identify Computational Correlates of Consciousness

A framework from recent philosophical work on consciousness, including cognitive phenomenology and mereological analysis, can help guide computational modeling. The authors argue that studying the computational mechanisms of working memory and cognitive control is especially likely to reveal computational correlates of consciousness. They describe their own computational models of human working memory and propose three such correlates: itinerant attractor sequences, top-down gating, and very fast weight changes. Current work tests whether these three correlates can support more complex models involving compositionality and basic causal inference. The authors conclude that computational models of working memory offer a promising path for understanding consciousness generally and for assessing the long-term potential of artificial consciousness.

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Abstract

Recent advances in philosophical thinking about consciousness, such as cognitive phenomenology and mereological analysis, provide a framework that facilitates using computational models to explore issues surrounding the nature of consciousness. Here we suggest that, in particular, studying the computational mechanisms of working memory and its cognitive control is highly likely to identify computational correlates of consciousness and thereby lead to a deeper understanding of the nature of consciousness. We describe our recent computational models of human working memory and propose that three computational correlates of consciousness follow from the results of this work: itinerant attractor sequences, top-down gating, and very fast weight changes. Our current investigation is focused on evaluating whether these three correlates are sufficient to create more complex working memory models that encompass compositionality and basic causal inference. We conclude that computational models of working memory are likely to be a fruitful approach to advancing our understanding of consciousness in general and in determining the long-term potential for development of an artificial consciousness specifically.