Consciousness regained? Philosophical arguments for and against reductive physicalism.
Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience March 1, 2012 DOI: 10.31887/dcns.2012.14.1/tsturm (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Conceivability argument Consciousness Explanatory gap Knowledge argument Multiple realization Qualia Reductionism |
| Key points | Argues that influential skeptical arguments against reductive physicalist explanations of qualia are not very convincing, but that ongoing reflection is needed to avoid dogmatism. |
Abstract
This paper is an overview of recent discussions concerning the mind-body problem, which is being addressed at the interface between philosophy and neuroscience. It focuses on phenomenal features of consciousness or "qualia," which are distinguished from various related issues. Then follows a discussion of various influential skeptical arguments that question the possibility of reductive explanations of qualia in physicalist terms: knowledge arguments, conceivability arguments, the argument of multiple realizability, and the explanatory gap argument. None of the arguments is found to be very convincing. It does not necessarily follow that reductive physicalism is the only option, but it is defensible. However, constant conceptual and methodological reflection is required, alongside ongoing research, to keep such a view free from dogmatism and naivety.