Kant and the scientific study of consciousness.
History of the Human Sciences January 1, 2010 DOI: 10.1177/0952695110363355 (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractKant's views on consciousness, the mind-body problem, and psychology as a science differ fundamentally from current debates about a science of consciousness. He did not use consciousness to mean phenomenal qualia, addressed the mind-body problem in terms of substances rather than mental properties, and saw the key to a scientific psychology as quantification, not mechanistic explanation. This illustrates how philosophical problems and concepts can shift dramatically despite surface similarities.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that Kant's philosophical positions on consciousness, the mind-body problem, and psychology as a science are radically different from their modern counterparts, revealing deep historical shifts in philosophical problems and concepts. |
Abstract
We argue that Kant's views about consciousness, the mind-body problem and the status of psychology as a science all differ drastically from the way in which these topics are conjoined in present debates about the prominent idea of a science of consciousness. Kant never used the concept of consciousness in the now dominant sense of phenomenal qualia; his discussions of the mind-body problem center not on the reducibility of mental properties but of substances; and his views about the possibility of psychology as a science did not employ the requirement of a mechanistic explanation, but of a quantification of phenomena. This shows strikingly how deeply philosophical problems and conceptions can change even if they look similar on the surface.