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Felt presence: paranoid delusion or hallucinatory social imagery?

Tore Nielsen

Consciousness and Cognition December 2007 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2007.02.002 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Commentary Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that felt presence during sleep paralysis is better explained as a purely spatial hallucinatory variant of social imagery than as a pre-hallucinatory expression of threat-activated vigilance, since both fearful and non-fearful felt presences occur in many situations and distress may be mediated by a general affective distress personality factor.

Abstract

Cheyne and Girard characterize felt presence (FP) during sleep paralysis attacks as a pre-hallucinatory expression of a threat-activated vigilance system. While their results may be consistent with this interpretation, they are nonetheless correlational and do not address a parsimonious alternative explanation. This alternative stipulates that FP is a purely spatial, hallucinatory form of a common cognitive phenomenon-social imagery-that is often, but not necessarily, linked with threat and fear and that may induce distress among susceptible individuals. The occurrence of both fearful and non-fearful FPs in a multiplicity of situations other than sleep paralysis attacks supports the notion that FPs are hallucinatory variants of social imagery and that they are not necessarily bound to threat-activated vigilance. Evidence linking FPs with anxiety disorders supports the notion that the distress they evoke may be mediated by a more general affective distress personality factor. To illustrate the predominantly spatial character of FP hallucinations, similarities between FP and phantom limbs are summarized and the possibility that these two phenomena are parallel expressions (self- vs. other-presence) of a mirror neuron system is considered.

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