The Goldilocks Dilemma: Commentary on Josh Weisberg’s Explanatory Optimism about the Hard Problem of Consciousness
Journal of Consciousness Studies August 1, 2025 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.32.7.175 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that Weisberg's explanatory optimism faces the Goldilocks dilemma: either his account of consciousness's properties fails to capture its exceptional features, or, if it does, his automated compression theory cannot debunk the appearance of exceptionalness. |
Abstract
In Explanatory Optimism about the Hard Problem of Consciousness, Josh Weisberg attempts to debunk the hard problem of consciousness. The hard problem arises from the thought that consciousness has exceptional properties inexplicable by science. Defending what he calls the automated compression theory (ACT), Weisberg argues that we have an easy explanation of consciousness that does not require us to posit any exceptional properties but yet fully accounts for why we would be so naturally led to think that such exceptional properties exist. In this commentary, I offer a challenge to Weisberg’s argument that is best seen as taking the form of a dilemma: either his account of the properties of consciousness do not adequately capture its exceptional features, or, if it does, then ACT does not adequately explain why consciousness would seem exceptional even if it weren???t (that is, ACT fails to do the debunking work Weisberg wants it to do). Call this the Goldilocks dilemma, as the problem arises from the fact that it???s hard for the explanatory optimist to find a specification of the exceptional properties of consciousness that are just right — either they are too ‘small’ to capture exceptionalness, or they are too ‘big’ to be debunked.
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