Some Comments on Josh Weisberg’s ‘Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness and the Heidelberg Problem’
Gerhard Preyer
ProtoSociology 2019 DOI: 10.5840/protosociology20193614 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Weisberg mischaracterizes the "Heidelberg Problem" and that his proposed resolution within the Higher-Order Thought Monitoring theory of consciousness is fundamentally flawed, while encouraging further philosophical exchange about the problem. |
Abstract
Josh Weisberg discusses what he calls the “Heidelberg Problem” (named after Dieter Henrich’s Heidelberg School). However, he mischaracterizes this problem and believes he is able so resolve the problem, as mischaracterized, as well as meet the de se constraint, in the theoretical frame of reference of the Higher-Order Thought Monitoring theory of consciousness. This commentary highlights the fundamental flaw in his approach, while encouraging further philosophical exchange with our American philosophical colleagues about the “Heidelberg Problem”.