A neuropsychoanalytical approach to the hard problem of consciousness.
Journal of Integrative Neuroscience June 1, 2014 DOI: 10.1142/s0219635214400032 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Freud Neuropsychoanalysis Consciousness Prediction error Subjectivity |
| Key points | Argues that affect is the primary modality of subjective consciousness, supplying the subjectivity that underpins all consciousness. |
Abstract
A neuropsychoanalytical approach to the hard problem of consciousness revolves around the distinction between the subject of consciousness and objects of consciousness. In contrast to the mainstream of cognitive science, neuropsychoanalysis prioritizes the subject. The subject of consciousness is the indispensable page upon which consciousness of objects is inscribed. This has implications for our conception of the mental. The subjective being of consciousness is not registered in the classical exteroceptive modalities; it is not merely a cognitive representation, not only a memory trace. Rather, the exteroceptive modalities are registered in the subjective being. Cognitive representations are mental solids embedded within subjectivity, the tangible and visible (etc) properties of which are projected onto reality. It is important to recognize that mental solids (e.g., the body-as-object) are no more real than the subjective being they are inscribed in (the body-as-subject). Moreover, pure subjectivity is not without content or quality. This aspect of consciousness is conventionally described quantitatively as the level of consciousness, or wakefulness. But it feels like something to be awake. The primary modality of this aspect of consciousness is affect. Affect supplies the subjectivity that underpins all consciousness. Some implications of this approach are discussed here, in broad brush strokes.
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| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cited by 14
- New insights into holonomic brain theory: implications for active consciousness Journal of Multiscale Neuroscience February 17, 2023
- Methodological issues in consciousness research: theory comparison, the role of empirical evidence, and a replication crisis. Frontiers in Psychology September 23, 2025
- Affektregulierung im Traum und Persönlichkeitsorganisation. Einblicke in eine aktuelle empirische Studie / Affect regulation in dreams and personality organization: Insights from an ongoing empirical study Zeitschrift für Individualpsychologie October 1, 2026
- Coming to (Terms with) Our Senses: Seeing, Hearing and Smelling the Gods Journal of Early Christian History September 2, 2017
- The Role of the Brain in Individuation Journal of Analytical Psychology April 27, 2025
and 9 more in the library
Cites 2
- The “Id” Knows More than the “Ego” Admits: Neuropsychoanalytic and Primal Consciousness Perspectives on the Interface Between Affective and Cognitive Neuroscience Brain Science April 17, 2012
- Consciousness in congenitally decorticate children: developmental vegetative state as self-fulfilling prophecy. Developmental medicine and child neurology June 1999