A neuropsychoanalytic approach to the hard problem of consciousness
April 17, 2018 DOI: 10.4324/9780429481758-12 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that unconscious processes pervade perception and cognition, as shown by phenomena like blindsight, and proposes that consciousness is not causally produced by representing reality but instead registers the subject's state within biological scales of values, with affect as its primal form. Prediction errors direct attention to salient representations via what K. Friston calls "free energy": entropy, lability, and uncertainty. |
Abstract
This chapter explains the hard problem of consciousness and neuropsychoanalytic approach. The fact of unconscious mental processes applies equally to perception and cognition. It is possible to see without awareness, blindsight, recognize without awareness, read without awareness, learn without awareness, remember without awareness, and make decisions without awareness. Subjective consciousness arises from being the portion of reality that generates consciousness. The relationship between seeing that portion of reality — representing it visually as, say, the innervations of the centrencephalic region — and simultaneously feeling it, is not a causal relationship. Consciousness registers the state of the subject within biological scales of values. The primal form of consciousness is a phenomenon known generally as affect. Prediction errors attract attention to the salient representations. This occurs through the generation of what K. Friston, following H. Helmholtz and Sigmund Freud, calls “free energy”: entropy, lability, and uncertainty.
Comparable studies
Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.
| Study | Year | Design | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. | 2003 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| From dopamine to salience to psychosis--linking biology, pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis. | 2005 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |