Monadic panmentalism, the hard problem of consciousness, and the ingredient problem
Synthese July 10, 2026 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-026-05697-5 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Metaphysics Philosophy of language Philosophy of science Grasp Consciousness Epistemology Domain mathematical analysis Common ground |
| Key points | Proposes that panmentalism, the view that each micro-object possesses an ability to be conscious, can solve the hard problem of consciousness and the ingredient problem facing panpsychism. |
Abstract
Abstract The hard problem of consciousness, introduced by Chalmers (1995, 2017), reveals that merely dispositional and relational physical properties cannot ground phenomenal properties. Panpsychism attempts to address this problem by positing that micro-objects possess phenomenal properties that ground our phenomenal properties. However, Nagasawa (2021) has argued that panpsychism faces the ingredient problem: we lack a transparent grasp of microphenomenal properties, and as a result, we cannot explain how these microphenomenal properties ground our phenomenal properties. I will argue that a new metaphysical theory about the mind, panmentalism, can solve the hard problem of consciousness and the ingredient problem. This view holds that each micro-object possesses an ability to be conscious. Abilities to be conscious and physical properties produce phenomenal properties. Concerns about unmanifestable dispositions lead to the view that only simples possess the ability to be conscious and phenomenal properties.