Are basic actors brainbound agents? Narrowing down solutions to the problem of probabilistic content for predictive perceivers
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences March 31, 2021 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-021-09736-z (opens in new tab) via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA philosophical puzzle arises from predictive processing (PP) accounts of perception: the brain encodes probabilistic information about sensory causes, yet conscious experience presents a single, determinate world. Clark proposes that action-guiding constraints on subpersonal representations resolve this disconnect, but his solution relies on a Davidsonian view of agency that conflicts with the extended-embodied mind thesis he also endorses. The author argues this inconsistency can be resolved either by abandoning the extended-embodied approach or by adopting a more radical enactivist, world-involving account of agency and perception.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Psychology Philosophy |
| Key finding | Argues that Clark's solution to the puzzle of probabilistic subpersonal representations and unitary perceptual experience relies on a Davidsonian view of agency that conflicts with his endorsement of the extended-embodied mind, and that he must choose between radical enactivism or consistent internalism. |
Abstract
Clark ( Journal of Consciousness Studies, 25 (3–4), 71–87, 2018 ) worries that predictive processing (PP) accounts of perception introduce a puzzling disconnect between the content of personal-level perceptual states and their underlying subpersonal representations. According to PP, in perception, the brain encodes information about the environment in conditional probability density distributions over causes of sensory input. But it seems perceptual experience only presents us with one way the world is at a time. If perception is at bottom probabilistic, shouldn’t this aspect of subpersonally represented content show up in consciousness? To address this worry, Clark argues that representations underlying personal-level content are constrained by the need to provide a single action-guiding take on the environment. However, this proposal rests a conception of the nature of agency, famously articulated by Davidson ( 1980a , b ), that is inconsistent with a view of the mind as embodied-extended. Since Clark and other enactivist PP theorists present the extended mind as an important consequence of the predictive framework, the proposal is in tension with his complete view. I claim that this inconsistency could be resolved either by retaining the Davidsonian view of action and abandoning the extended-embodied approach, or by adopting a more processual, world-involving account of agency and perceptual experience than Clark currently endorses. To solve the puzzle he raises, Clark must become a radical enactivist or a consistent internalist.