Does artificial intelligence exhibit basic fundamental subjectivity? A neurophilosophical argument
Georg Northoff, Steven S. Gouveia
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences February 26, 2024 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-024-09971-0 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Subjectivity Consciousness Epistemology Argument complex analysis Cognitive science Phenomenology philosophy Metaphysics |
| Citations | 12 |
| Key points | Argues that current AI does not exhibit a basic or fundamental subjectivity and therefore no consciousness or self is possible in models such as ChatGPT and similar technologies. |
Abstract
Abstract Does artificial intelligence (AI) exhibit consciousness or self? While this question is hotly debated, here we take a slightly different stance by focusing on those features that make possible both, namely a basic or fundamental subjectivity. Learning from humans and their brain, we first ask what we mean by subjectivity. Subjectivity is manifest in the perspectiveness and mineness of our experience which, ontologically, can be traced to a point of view. Adopting a non-reductive neurophilosophical strategy, we assume that the point of view exhibits two layers, a most basic neuroecological and higher order mental layer. The neuroecological layer of the point of view is mediated by the timescales of world and brain, as further evidenced by empirical data on our sense of self. Are there corresponding timescales shared with the world in AI and is there a point of view with perspectiveness and mineness? Discussing current neuroscientific evidence, we deny that current AI exhibits a point of view, let alone perspectiveness and mineness. We therefore conclude that, as per current state, AI does not exhibit a basic or fundamental subjectivity and henceforth no consciousness or self is possible in models such as ChatGPT and similar technologies.
Comparable studies
Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.
| Study | Year | Design | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. | 2003 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| From dopamine to salience to psychosis--linking biology, pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis. | 2005 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cites 17
- How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews September 1, 2017
- Is the self a higher-order or fundamental function of the brain? The "basis model of self-specificity" and its encoding by the brain's spontaneous activity. Cognitive Neuroscience 2016
- The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness Oxford University Press eBooks July 9, 2020
- The temporal structure of resting-state brain activity in the medial prefrontal cortex predicts self-consciousness Neuropsychologia January 21, 2016
- Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) - Bridging the gap of neuronal activity and phenomenal states. Behavioural Brain Research February 1, 2022
and 12 more in the library