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The Content and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience

Elisabetta Sacchi

Phenomenology and Mind November 26, 2016 DOI: 10.13128/phe_mi-19596 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Citations 2
Key points Argues that strong, reductive representationalism risks providing either an inadequate phenomenological account or an inadequate account of the content of the experience.

Abstract

The paper’s main target is strong and reductive “representationalism”. What we claim is that even though this position looks very appealing in so far as it does not postulate intrinsic and irreducible experiential properties, the attempt it pursues of accounting for the phenomenology of experience in terms of representational content runs the risk of providing either an inadequate phenomenological account or an inadequate account of the content of the experience.

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