Towards a computational (neuro)phenomenology of mental action: modelling meta-awareness and attentional control with deep-parametric active inference
Lars Sandved-Smith, Casper Hesp, Antoine Lutz, Jérémie Mattout, Karl Friston, Maxwell James Ramstead
PsyArXiv June 10, 2020 preprint DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/5jh3c (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Citations | 11 |
| Key points | Proposes that meta-awareness can be modeled as a higher-order belief about the precision of attentional policies within a deep-parametric active inference framework. |
Abstract
Towards a computational (neuro)phenomenology of mental action: modelling meta-awareness and attentional control with deep-parametric active inference