Against Phenomenal Bonding
S Siddharth
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy April 15, 2024 DOI: 10.31820/ejap.17.1.3 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Combination problem Subject-summing Phenomenal bonding Constitutive panpsychism |
| Citations | 3 |
| Key points | Argues that the phenomenal bonding relation proposed by Goff and Miller does not satisfactorily resolve the subject-summing argument against panpsychism. |
Abstract
Panpsychism, the view that phenomenal consciousness is possessed by all fundamental physical entities, faces an important challenge in the form of the combination problem: how do experiences of microphysical entities combine or give rise to the experiences of macrophysical entities such as human beings? An especially troubling aspect of the combination problem is the subject-summing argument, according to which the combination of subjects is not possible. In response to this argument, Goff (2016) and Miller (2017) have proposed the phenomenal bonding relation, using which they seek to explain the composition of subjects. In this paper, I discuss the merits of the phenomenal bonding solution and argue that it fails to respond satisfactorily to the subject-summing argument.
Citations in the library
Cited by 4
- Are Composite Subjects Possible? A Clarification of the Subject Combination Problem Facing Panpsychism European Journal of Analytic Philosophy August 26, 2024
- The universe as aṁśa of Brahman: towards a Viśiṣṭādvaita existence-cosmopsychism Religious Studies July 31, 2026
- Evaluating Panpsychism Crítica (México D F En línea) December 17, 2025
- A Reply to S Siddharth’s ‘Against Phenomenal Bonding’ European Journal of Analytic Philosophy April 15, 2024