How chromatic phenomenality largely overflow its cognitive accessibility.
Consciousness and Cognition December 1, 2009 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2009.08.007 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Proposes that the information represented in phenomenal consciousness greatly exceeds the information in accompanying access consciousness, due to the role of mereologically superordinate concepts in mediating cognitive access. |
Abstract
It has been suggested (Block, 2007) that the core neural bases for visual phenomenal consciousness and for access consciousness are located in anatomically separate regions. If this is correct, and if, as Block suggests, the core neural substrate of visual phenomenality is located early in the visual cortex where detailed chromatic information is available, then it would be reasonable to infer that our intuitions of chromatically rich visual phenomenality are plausible. It is furthermore suggested that during perception cognitive access to this chromatic cornucopia is mediated through mereologically superordinate (MS) concepts that regionally characterize both semantic and quantitative integrated properties within complex visual percepts. Such concepts contain much less information than do the particulars that they characterize, implying that the information represented in phenomenal consciousness greatly exceeds the information in the accompanying access consciousness.