Spór o naturę świadomości
Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna September 17, 2020 DOI: 10.14746/fped.2013.2.1.10 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Materialism Conceivability Possibility The knowledge argument Phenomenal concepts |
| Key points | Argues that materialists have no satisfactory response to arguments that conscious states are not physical states. |
Abstract
Although phenomenal consciousness resists explanation in physical terms, it remains an open question whether or not consciousness is an intrinsically physical phenomenon since it remains an open question whether or not conscious states are identical with physical states. This question is one of the key issues of debate in contemporary philosophy of mind. Here I survey some of the key arguments designed to show that conscious states are not physical states. I argue that materialists have no satisfactory response to those arguments.