Świadomość i jej intuicyjna niefizyczność
Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia March 29, 2026 DOI: 10.19195/1895-8001.20.2.5 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Intuition of dualism Phenomenal concepts Identity Epistemic gap |
| Key points | Argues that the intuition of dualism is a genuine epistemic problem because psychophysical identities are not deducible from physical truths. |
Abstract
Explaining the intuition that phenomenal consciousness is not a physical property is crucial in the debate on the nature of consciousness. There are two competing strategies of how to approach this issue in the literature. Some assume that the intuition of dualism is a psychological illusion, others treat this intuition as a genuine cognitive problem which is not the result of an error. This article indicates the reasons for which the proposed theories of both types are not satisfactory and in addition articulates a new argument for the claim that the intuition of dualism is a genuine epistemic problem. The source of the problem lies in the fact that psychophysical identities are not deducible from physical truths.