In an interview, Tyler Burge discusses perceptual anti-individualism, the view that the identity of many mental kinds depends on the creature's relations to the physical or social environment. He explains that this framework underpins his theory of perceptual representation and was implicitly assumed by perceptual psychology. Burge contrasts his approach with classic representational theories of perceptual experience, reductive theories of mental content, and theories of phenomenal consciousness, elaborating on the main tenets and philosophical underpinnings of his position.
The author argues that many mental processes thought to be unconscious are actually conscious, with the appearance of unconsciousness arising because researchers mistake meta-consciousness—awareness of one's own awareness—for consciousness itself. After redefining consciousness more rigorously, the author reinterprets empirical data and identifies two phenomena supporting the hypothesis: conscious experiences that are not re-represented during introspection, and dissociated experiences inaccessible to the executive ego. If all mental processes are inherently conscious, consciousness may be fundamental to nature rather than a product of specific brain functions.