Knowing Mental States: The Asymmetry of Psychological Prediction and Explanation
Consciousness January 23, 2003 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199241286.003.0008 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that if the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis is correct, self-consciousness cannot be understood without also understanding consciousness of others' mental states, because knowledge of our own minds evolved from the need to predict and respond to others' behavior. |
Abstract
Abstract: The Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis promotes the view that cognition, and with it consciousness, is an evolutionary adaptation that arose owing to the complexities of social life (Humphrey 1976; Whiten and Byrne 1988). According to this view, we have knowledge of our own minds because we needed to have knowledge of others’ minds. We needed to be able to predict what others were going to do in the future so that we could act to thwart their behaviours when they interfered with our own goals. If the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis is right, our self-consciousness cannot be understood without also understanding our consciousness of others’ mental states.