Is consciousness required for AI welfare?
Asian Journal of Philosophy February 5, 2026 DOI: 10.1007/s44204-026-00382-3 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Goldstein and Kirk-Giannini's case for consciousness-free AI well-being fails and that their position generates counterintuitive implications more problematic than those they attribute to consciousness-requiring views, so sentience should remain a requirement for AI welfare. |
Abstract
Abstract Goldstein and Kirk–Giannini have recently argued that artificial language agents can possess well-being in the absence of phenomenal consciousness. Here, I challenge their position, contending that their arguments fail to establish that consciousness is dispensable for well-being. Moreover, their arguments generate counterintuitive implications that are more problematic than those they attribute to views requiring consciousness for welfare subjecthood. Thus, consciousness (or rather sentience) should still be treated as a requirement for AI welfare.